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CARD CHECK RECOGNITION:  NEW HOUSE
RULES FOR UNION ORGANIZING?
Rafael Gely* and Timothy D. Chandler**
I. INTRODUCTION
A significant policy debate has been occurring regarding union
organizing methods in the United States.  This debate focuses on
the appropriateness of granting union recognition based on major-
ity support as demonstrated by union authorization card signa-
tures, also known as “card checking.”1  Critics describe the practice
as anathema to basic democratic principles and accuse unions of
wanting to deal from the bottom of the deck to secure undeserved
representation of employees.2  Proponents of card check recogni-
tion argue that reliance on National Labor Relations Board
(“NLRB”) organizing procedures fails to protect employees’ rights
to organize, and forces unions to compete against a stacked deck
that unfairly favors employers.3  Indeed, the labor movement in the
United States has long been dissatisfied with the legal framework
* Judge Joseph P. Kinneary Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati.
** Robert H. and Patricia Hines Professor of Management, William and Cathe-
rine M. Rucks Department of Management, E.J. Ourso College of Business, Louisi-
ana State University.
1. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Presses for Measure to Ease Unionizing, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2006, at A28 (describing the ongoing effort by the labor movement to
enact legislation regarding the use of card checks).
2. See Steven Greenhouse, Employers Sharply Criticize Shift in Unionizing
Method to Cards From Elections, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at A9 (describing em-
ployers’ opposition to the card check process). See generally Carl F. Horowitz, Why
Union Card Checks Are Coercive, NAT’L LEGAL & POL’Y CENTER, http://www.nlpc.
org/view.asp?action=viewArticle&aid=1638 (last visited Jan. 02, 2008); James Sherk,
How Union Card Checks Block Workers’ Free Choice, HERITAGE FOUND., Feb. 21,
2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/Labor/wm1366.cfm.
3. See ADRIENNE EATON & JILL KRIESKY, AMERICAN RIGHTS AT WORK, FACT
OVER FICTION:  OPPOSITION TO CARD CHECK DOESN’T ADD UP (Mar. 2006), availa-
ble at http://www.americanrightsatwork.org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/IBFact
OverFictFinal.pdf (examining the validity of claims by anti-union groups that card
check campaigns leave employees more vulnerable to union pressure than during Na-
tional Labor Relations Board elections); see also GORDON LAFER, AMERICAN
RIGHTS AT WORK,  FREE AND FAIR?:  HOW LABOR LAW FAILS U.S. DEMOCRATIC
ELECTION STANDARDS (June 2005), available at http://www.americanrightsatwork.
org/dmdocuments/ARAWReports/FreeandFair%20FINAL.pdf (assessing the extent
to which National Labor Relation Board elections embody democratic principles).
247
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under which unions operate.4  This frustration was illustrated by
American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organi-
zations (“AFL-CIO”) President Lane Kirkland’s statement in the
early 1980s suggesting that the National Labor Relations Act
(“NLRA”)5 be repealed, thereby allowing unions and employers to
operate within the “law of the jungle.”6
Perhaps owing to sustained union membership losses, unions
have recently fought hard for legislation that will facilitate the or-
ganizing process.7  Specifically, unions are supporting amendments
to the NLRA, such as the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007
(“EFCA”), which requires employers to recognize a union when
the employer is presented with evidence of majority support for
union recognition via card check.8  The EFCA requires the NLRB
to develop model authorization language and procedures for estab-
lishing the validity of signed authorization cards.9  The EFCA also
provides stronger penalties for employers’ violations occurring
while employees are attempting to form a union or attain a first
contract.10  These amendments would represent a significant depar-
ture from the NLRA, which currently allows for card check or-
ganizing based only on voluntary acquiescence of the employer, an
4. See Paul F. Clark et al., Private-Sector Collective Bargaining:  Is This the End
or a New Beginning?, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 1, 8-9
(Paul F. Clark et al., eds. 2002) (discussing the complaints unions have voiced about
the current legal framework regulating the collective bargaining process); see also
THOMAS GEOGHEHAN, WHICH SIDE ARE YOU ON? 252-56 (1991) (discussing various
unions’ concerns regarding the existing labor laws).
5. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-169 (2000)).
6. See Cathy Trost & Leonard M. Apcar, AFL-CIO Chief Calls Labor Laws a
‘Dead Letter’—Kirkland Says the Federation Would ‘Seriously’ Study Repeal of All
But the Basic, WALL ST. J., Aug. 16, 1984, at 8 (noting Kirkland’s frustration with
President Reagan’s administration of the NLRA).
7. See generally Linda Chavez-Thompson, Labor and the American Dream, DEN-
VER POST, Sept. 3, 2007 available at http://www.denverpost.com/search/ci_6787565
(discussing the recent failed attempt by Congress to enact legislation authorizing the
use of card checks).
8. S. 1041 § 2(a), 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
9. Id.
10. Id. § 4(b).  The proposed amendments provide for civil fines up to $20,000 per
violation against employers found to have willfully or repeatedly violated employees’
rights during an organizing campaign or first contract drive.  The EFCA also increases
the amount an employer is required to pay when an employee is discharged or dis-
criminated against during an organizing campaign or first contract drive to three times
back pay.  Finally, the EFCA requires the Board to seek a federal court injunction
against an employer whenever there is reasonable cause to believe the employer has
discharged or discriminated against employees, threatened to discharge or discrimi-
nate against employees, or engaged in conduct that significantly interferes with em-
ployee rights during an organizing or first contract drive. Id.
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unlikely event given the strident opposition to unions by U.S.
employers.11
Despite their importance, little has been written in the academic
literature about the experiences of unions and employers with the
use of the card check organizing process.12  This Article seeks to fill
this gap.  We collected data on every organizing event the AFL-
CIO publicly reported between 1998 and 2005.13  The list of events
includes government-conducted elections, card checks, and other
events.14  While the data are not exhaustive of all union organizing
events, the data provide a more comprehensive view of the recent
experience with card checks than other currently available sources.
The data also allow us to evaluate some of the justifications that
have been advanced in support of the proposed changes to existing
law, as well as to explore the possible consequences of those
changes.
We examine the claim frequently made by supporters of the pro-
posed legislation that, for all practical purposes, unions have aban-
doned the election route to representation in favor of the card
check process.15  Citing data from the AFL-CIO, supporters of pro-
posed reforms claim that less than twenty percent of all union or-
ganizing is conducted through Board certified elections and that
most new members are now joining the labor movement via card
11. See Thomas A. Kochan et al., The Effects of Corporate Strategy and Workplace
Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 487 (1986) (noting
that a significant percentage of employers considered being nonunion their major la-
bor relations goal).
12. But cf. James J. Brudney, Neutrality Agreements and Card Check Recognition:
Prospects for Changing Paradigms, 90 IOWA L. REV. 819, 828-30 (2005); Adrienne E.
Eaton & Jill Kriesky, Union Organizing Under Neutrality and Card Check Agree-
ments, 55 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 42 (2001) [hereinafter Eaton & Kriesky, Union
Organizing]; Jennifer Dillard & Joel Dillard, Fetishizing the Electoral Process: The
NLRB’s Problematic Embrace of Electoral Formalism (Working Paper Series, Aug.
24, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009636.
13. The data were collected from the AFL-CIO’s weekly publication Work in Pro-
gress.  Part III of this Article discusses the origins of the publication as well as the
advantages and disadvantages of relying on this source.
14. For example, the reported events include reported mergers and affiliation
agreements between members of the AFL-CIO and independent unions. See infra
notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
15. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 12, at 828 (discussing the increasing use of card R
checks, and corresponding decline in government sponsored elections); Rick Valliere,
Unions Turning Away from NLRB Elections as Primary Way of Organizing, Raynor
Says, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Jan. 12, 2006, at C-3 (reporting on comments by
Bruce S. Raynor, president of UNITE-HERE, to the extent that only ten percent of
the employees joining UNITE-HERE during 2005 joined via NLRB conducted
elections).
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check recognition or some alternative procedure.16  Our data do
not support this claim.  In particular, we find that during the period
from 1998 to 2005, unions reported organizing the majority of their
workers through some type of government-sponsored election.
While non-trivial, the number of non-election events (e.g. card
checks, mergers, and affiliations) and the number of employees or-
ganized through these events do not account for the majority of
union organizing activity.
More importantly, we find that the current rate of card check use
appears to be limited to a few unions in specific industries.  Em-
ployers in these industries tend to be those who otherwise might
have a reduced incentive to oppose unions. In other words, em-
ployers who have abandoned the current system might not be rep-
resentative of employers in general.  In fact, available evidence
suggests that most employers oppose card check recognition or, at
least, prefer the use of Board election procedures.
This latter finding is important when assessing proposed amend-
ments to the NLRA that would facilitate the card check process.
If, as our data suggest, most employers remain reluctant to agree to
card check recognition, passing legislation along the lines of the
Employee Free Choice Act of 2007 can force employers to acqui-
esce to card checks, but such legislation will not remove employers’
incentives to oppose unions.  We suggest that employers will likely
respond to such legislation by shifting their union avoidance activi-
ties to earlier stages in the organizing process, perhaps even before
any organizing effort starts.  Employers, for example, could simply
engage in more intense monitoring systems to detect union or-
ganizing campaigns earlier—that is, they will not have the luxury of
waiting for the union to request recognition before launching into a
vigorous opposition campaign.  This type of reaction by employers
could be very effective, and is one which the proposed legislation
does not address.  We surmise that while the proposed legislation
could be a good first step in expanding the ability of workers to
organize collectively, it is important to realize that employers are
likely to react to such changes by also altering their behavior.  Any
proposed legislation should anticipate and address this possibility.
Part II briefly discusses the mechanics of NLRB elections and
card checks and, more importantly, the incentives both unions and
employers have for using one or the other.17  Part III describes our
16. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 828-29. R
17. See infra notes 21-50 and accompanying text. R
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data,18 and Part IV reports our findings.19  Part V discusses the im-
plications of our findings for the current policy debate regarding
the card check process.20  Part VI concludes the article.
II. THE DYNAMICS OF NLRB SPONSORED
ELECTIONS AND CARD CHECKS
A labor union can become the majority representative of a
group of employees either through a NLRB-sponsored election or
through voluntary employer recognition.21  The employer and the
union seeking recognition regularly precede the NLRB-sponsored
election with vigorous campaigning, but it is employers’ behavior
that has tended to generate the most concern.  During the cam-
paign process, which usually lasts several weeks, employers engage
in a variety of activities to counteract the union.  Various scholars
have documented both the range of tactics that employers use in
the course of an organizing campaign,22 as well as the effect such
tactics have on organizing election outcomes.23  Some of the prac-
tices employers commonly use during organizing campaigns in-
clude the communication to employees of the employers’ views
regarding the presence of a union, via letters, pamphlets, and cap-
tive audience speeches.24  Employers also frequently hire outside
18. See infra notes 51-61 and accompanying text. R
19. See infra notes 62-113 and accompanying text. R
20. See infra notes 114-27 and accompanying text. R
21. For a description of the organizing process, see ROBERT A. GORMAN & MAT-
THEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:  UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 53-67 (2d ed. 2004).
22. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, The Role of Union Strategies in NLRB Certification
Elections, 50 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 195, 201-05 (1997) (listing several tactics com-
monly used by employers in the course of organizing campaigns); William T. Dickens,
The Effect of Company Campaigns on Certification Elections:  Law and Reality Once
Again, 36 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560, 563-67 (1983) (analyzing the effect of em-
ployer tactics in organizing election outcomes); John J. Lawler, The Influence of Man-
agement Consultants on the Outcome of Union Certification Elections, 38 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 38, 38-39 (1984) (describing the effects of the use of management
consultants on union organizing elections).
23. See RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? 234-
36 (1984) (discussing the findings of several studies regarding the effect of employers’
campaigns in election outcomes); see also Kate L. Bronfenbrenner, Employer Behav-
ior in Certification Elections and First Contract Campaigns:  Implications for Labor
Law Reform, in RESTORING THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LABOR LAW 75, 80-82 (Shel-
don Friedman et al. eds., 1994) (discussing the impact of a variety of employers’ tac-
tics both in election outcomes and in successful first contract negotiations).
24. Captive audience speeches refer to mandatory meetings held at the workplace,
during work time, in which employers present their case for opposing the union. See
TERRY L. LEAP, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING & LABOR RELATIONS 146-48 (2d ed.
1995).
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consultants to manage the campaign, and often encourage the for-
mation of “Vote No” committees comprised of employees that op-
pose the union.25
Although legally permissible in principle, any communications
with employees could become illegal if the employer uses them to
either threaten or interfere with employees’ rights under the
NLRA.26  For example, while the employer can distribute litera-
ture and communicate with employees, the employer cannot
threaten to fire, or actually fire an employee because of that em-
ployee’s union activities.27  Similarly, it is illegal for an employer
during the course of an organizing campaign to threaten to close or
relocate operations if the union wins the certification election.28  It
is also illegal in the course of any communications with employees
for the employer to promise or actually implement changes in the
terms and conditions of employment.29  Yet these illegal activities
occur on a fairly frequent basis.  Research on employers’ campaign
conduct shows that since the mid-1970s employers have become
much more willing to engage in illegal activities during the course
of an organizing campaign.30
The card check process, which involves voluntary recognition of
the union by the employer based on a showing of majority support
25. See Lawler, supra note 22, at 39. R
26. See NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969).
27. See Central Valley Meat Co., 346 N.L.R.B. No. 94 (Apr. 28, 2006) (holding
that employer violated the NLRA by threatening to fire and firing various employees
during the course of an organizing campaign).
28. See Reeves Bros., 320 N.L.R.B. 1082 (1996) (finding that the employer had
violated section 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by reading to employees during a captive audi-
ence meeting two letters from two of the company’s clients indicating that the clients
would reduce or eliminate their business if the union won the organizing election).
29. See NLRB v. Exchange Parts Co., 375 U.S. 405, 409 (1964) (comparing bene-
fits granted during an organizing campaign to a “fist inside the velvet glove,” the
Court held that the granting of benefits during an organizing campaign was a violation
of the NLRA).
30. Charles J.  Morris, A Tale of Two Statutes:  Discrimination for Union Activity
Under the NLRA and RLA, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 317, 330-31 (1998) (noting
that the violations of section 8(a)(3)—the type of unfair labor practice charge most
likely to be filed in the course of an organizing campaign—per election held, in-
creased four times between 1968 and 1998); see also JOHN SCHMITT & BEN ZIPPERER,
CENTER FOR ECONOMIC AND POLICY RESEARCH, DROPPING THE AX:  ILLEGAL FIR-
INGS DURING UNION ELECTION CAMPAIGNS (Jan. 2007) (finding a steep rise in the
2000s relative to the last half of the 1990s in illegal firings of pro-union workers).
Although the upward trend in employers’ violations of the NLRA is well docu-
mented, the reasons behind the increase are less clear.  Some commentators argue the
increase could be attributed to the relatively weak penalties provided under the
NLRA. See Morris, supra, at 318.
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via representation cards,31 provides an alternative to the NLRB-
supervised election process.  The use of card checks is not entirely
new in U.S. labor relations.32  In fact, various commentators have
noted that following the enactment of the NLRA, the Board fre-
quently certified unions on the basis of card check agreements.33
During these earlier years, Board supervised elections were used
primarily in situations where the employer questioned the status of
the union as the majority bargaining representative, while the card
check was the default recognition method.34  A few years after the
NLRA was enacted, and due to issues of institutional legitimacy,35
the Board began showing a preference for elections as the primary
means of union certification.36  The Board’s shift was further ex-
tended when Congress amended the NLRA in 1947.37  Thus, secret
ballot elections became the primary way for the Board to certify a
union as the exclusive bargaining representative of a group of
employees.38
From the perspective of labor unions, card checks have several
advantages.  By eliminating much of the campaigning that occurs
between the union’s request for recognition and the scheduled
election, there is less opportunity for the employer to engage in
anti-union campaigning,39 and some of the employer abuses that
typically occur during union organizing might be avoided.40  More-
over, card check recognition should minimize delays that often
characterize the NLRB organizing process and which research in-
dicates decrease the likelihood of a union victory.41  In short, the
card check process should make it easier for unions to communi-
cate their message to employees and have the employees make a
31. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 825-26. R
32. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 12, at 16. R
33. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 828-30; Dillard & Dillard, supra note 12, at 11. R
34. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 12, at 14. R
35. Id. at 16 (arguing that the Board’s shift towards preference for secret ballot
elections was a move taken in response to challenges to the Board’s impartiality and
institutional validity).
36. See In re Cudahy Packing, 13 N.L.R.B. 526, 531-32 (1939) (indicating a prefer-
ence for elections where two unions claimed majority status).
37. Among the amendments to the NLRA Congress adopted in 1947 was section
9(c)(1)(b) providing that “[i]f the Board finds upon the records of such hearing that
such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.”   29 U.S.C.A. § 159 (c)(1)(b) (West 2000).
38. See Dillard & Dillard, supra note 12, at 18. R
39. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 833. R
40. Id. at 832-35.
41. See Bronfenbrenner, supra note 23, at 78-79. R
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decision without undue pressure by the employer.42  A shorter or-
ganizing process which consumes fewer union resources might also
free up both time and money for unions to pursue other organizing
targets.43
Although advantages to unions can easily be identified, why
would employers ever agree to card check recognition?  This would
seem to be a difficult question to answer given long-standing em-
ployer opposition to unions that has characterized U.S. labor-man-
agement relations.44  Yet the answer is clear: employers will agree
to card checks if it is in their economic interest to do so.45  In fact,
research suggests that in agreeing to card checks, many employers
point out the importance of avoiding the costs associated with
mounting a vigorous anti-union campaign.46  For other employers,
however, card checks could result in significant benefits.47  For in-
stance, the presence of a union could make it easier to recruit,
train, and retain employees.48  Other employers might see card
checks as a trade-off necessary to obtain the support of unions in
pursuing their legislative agendas.49  In short, for some employers
the potential costs of having a union may be outweighed by other
business needs.  These employers realize that making it easier for
the union to organize is a good business decision.
This discussion suggests that unions should prefer to operate
under a system in which employers are required to recognize the
42. Id.
43. See Paula B. Voos, Union Organizing:  Costs and Benefits, 36 INDUS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 576, 576-77 (1983) (discussing the costs associated with mounting an or-
ganizing campaign).
44. See THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN IN-
DUSTRIAL RELATIONS 37-45 (1986) (describing historical trends in employers’ opposi-
tion to labor unions).
45. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 835-40. R
46. These costs could include hiring the consultant, running the campaign, lost
work time, and legal expenses.  For those employers that have an existing bargaining
relationship, an additional cost is the potential harm to the labor-management rela-
tionship associated with an anti-union campaign.  The decision by employers to agree
to a card check procedure can be motivated as well by the desire to avoid the negative
business consequences associated with a union led corporate campaign. See Eaton &
Kriesky, Union Organizing, supra note 12, at 48-51; see also Adrienne E. Eaton & Jill R
Kriesky, Dancing with the Smoke Monster: Employer Motivations for Negotiating
Neutrality and Card Check Agreements, in JUSTICE ON THE JOB: PERSPECTIVES ON
THE EROSION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES 139, 147-50
(Richard N. Block et al. eds., 2006) [hereinafter Eaton & Kriesky, Employer
Motivations].
47. See Eaton & Kriesky, Employer Motivations, supra note 46, at 144-47. R
48. Id. at 146.
49. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 838. R
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union if presented with a card check majority.  It is also clear that
some employers perceive the card check process to make economic
sense, and thus voluntarily agree to be bound by it.  But, it must
also be true that for many other employers the card check process
does not make sound business sense.  One only needs to look at
the many employer organizations that lined up in opposition to
card check recognition to see how unpopular it is in some
quarters.50  That group of employers should be expected to con-
tinue opposing any attempts at unionization, either by refusing to
recognize a union through the card check process, as is currently
their option, or if the law denies that option, by engaging in other
activities that minimize the ability of unions to organize the
workplace.
III. DATA
We collected data on the occurrence of all organizing events re-
ported in the AFL-CIO’s weekly publication, Work in Progress
(“WIP”).  The AFL-CIO began weekly publication of WIP in
1996.51  In the first issue, the AFL-CIO described the objective of
WIP as “an effort to communicate more quickly and effectively
with union leaders, supporters and activists across the country.”52
In later issues, WIP encouraged member unions to send informa-
tion about new organizing victories since “[o]rganizing new work-
ers is the most important goal of the labor movement.”53
We read through all issues from 1998 to 2005 and coded several
pieces of data related to union organizing activities.  The descrip-
tion of the reported organizing events regularly included informa-
tion on the union or unions involved, the number of employees
directly involved in the event, the name of the employer, the loca-
tion (city and state), and the type of organizing event (e.g., govern-
ment sponsored election, card check recognition, merger, etc.).54
In addition, from this information we were usually able to assess
50. See Steven Greenhouse, Clash Nears in the Senate on Legislation Helping Un-
ions Organize, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at A16 (pointing out that business groups
have mounted a major campaign against the proposed legislation).
51. See AFL-CIO, The First Bulletin, WORK IN PROGRESS, (Jan. 23, 1996), http://
www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/wip/wip01231996.cfm (announcing
the first issue of Work in Progress).
52. Id.
53. See AFL-CIO, Editor’s Note, WORK IN PROGRESS, (July 27, 1998), http://www.
aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/wip/wip07271998.cfm.
54. Our ability to code each case depended on the level of detail provided in WIP.
If the information was not provided, or if the information was not clear, we coded it
as missing data.
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whether the employees were private or public sector employees, as
well as the industry in which they worked.55
Several caveats about the data are in order.  First, the informa-
tion provided in WIP does not claim to be exhaustive.  That is, WIP
does not list every organizing event in which AFL-CIO unions
were involved during this period.  Thus, our data do not represent
the whole universe of organizing activity during this period, but
only those events which were reported in WIP.56
Second, the AFL-CIO member unions self-report the organizing
events reported in WIP.  While there is no way of knowing whether
there were any systematic biases in the way unions decided to re-
port their organizing activity to WIP, there is also no reason to
expect unions to under or over report one type of organizing
method relative to others.
A comparison of our data to the extant data on card checks,
though, suggests that our sample is consistent with published re-
search.  For example, in their study of union organizing under neu-
trality and card check agreements Professors Adrienne Eaton and
Jill Kriesky surveyed fifty-seven national unions “with 10,000 or
more members primarily in the private sector” about their experi-
ence with these organizing methods.  Of the thirty-six respondents,
twenty-three reported having at least one card check agreement.57
Our data include reports by eighty-one unions,  representing em-
ployees in both the private and public sectors without any restric-
tions on union size, of which thirty-six reported having experienced
a card check organizing event.  Eaton and Kriesky report that the
majority of the card check agreements in their data occurred in the
service sector, with the majority of these taking place in the hospi-
55. For example, WIP might identify the employees as “public employees.”  When
WIP did not directly identify the employees as private sector or public sector, we
attempted to identify the public or private nature of the employees by relying on the
employer’s name.
56. As far as we know, there is not public data identifying the total number of
types of organizing events (i.e., elections, card checks, etc.) occurring in the Unites
States.  This lack of data is especially problematic with regard to card checks, since
card checks are not recorded by the NLRB. See NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD, N.L.R.B. ELECTION REPORT:  CASES CLOSED AUGUST 2007, (Sept. 2007),
http://www.nlrb.gov/nlrb/shared_files/brochures/Election%20Reports/August2007.pdf
(noting that the monthly election reports, on which the NLRB’s annual reports are
based, list the outcome of secret-ballot voting in NLRB-conducted representation
elections); see also SCHMITT & ZIPPERER, supra note 30, at 7-8 (discussing how the R
lack of NLRB data on card checks affects the empirical analysis of illegal employers’
activities during election campaigns).
57. See Eaton & Kriesky, Union Organizing, supra note 12, at 45. R
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tality, gaming, and telecommunications industries.58  As reported
below,59 our data also indicate that service sector card checks re-
present a large majority of all card check events,60 and most of
these occurred in the communications, hospitality, and health care
industries.61
Thus, the data available through WIP provide a large union—
and industry-wide sample of organizing activities occurring be-
tween 1998 and 2005 that is generally consistent with data used in
prior research.  These data, we submit, present a picture of the re-
cent experience of unions with card check agreements and other
organizing methods.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Reports on Total Organizing Activity
We start by looking at the total number of organizing events re-
ported in WIP.  We find there were 3847 organizing events.  These
organizing events resulted in the addition of approximately 1.9 mil-
lion unionized workers.  Of these, 762,955 were employees who
work in industries under the NLRB’s jurisdiction (“NLRA Em-
ployees”),62 while about 1.1 million were what we refer to as “Non-
NLRA Employees.”63  Of this latter group, the very large majority
(93%) were public sector employees.  In fact, the majority of or-
ganizing activity reported in WIP involved public sector employees
58. Id.
59. See infra notes 87-92 and accompanying text. R
60. Of the 730 card check events reported in our data, 523 (72%) can be catego-
rized as occurring in the service sector, e.g., “Food & Beverages/General Merchandise
Stores,” “Information,” “Educational Services,” “Health Care and Social Assistance,”
“Performing Arts, Spectator Sports, and Related Industries,” “Amusement, Gam-
bling and Recreation Industries,” “Accommodation and Food Services,” “Personal
and Laundry Services,” and “Public Administration.” See infra p. 275 tbl.4.
61. Of the 523 events occurring in the service sector, 384 (or 73%) involved em-
ployers in the communications, hospitality and health care industries. See id.
62. The NLRB jurisdiction is rather broad, covering any private sector enterprise
whose operations affect commerce. See 29 U.S.C. § 160.
63. This category includes public sector employees (federal, state, and local gov-
ernments).  Public sector employees do not fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRB,
and instead are covered by a variety of other federal and state collective bargaining
laws.  “Non-NLRA Employees” also include railroad and airline employees, who are
covered under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-188 (West 2007), and em-
ployees organized by AFL-CIO affiliated unions in Canada. Section 2(2) of the
NLRA specifically excludes “[t]he United States or any wholly owned Government
corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political subdivision
thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act . . . .” See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).
Section 2(3) excludes “agricultural laborers” from the NLRA’s coverage. See id.
§ 152(3).
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(56%).  This finding is consistent with other surveys which show
that a large percentage of union organizing activity over the last
several years has occurred in the public sector.64
Table 1 provides a breakdown of the type of organizing events
reported in WIP.  During the relevant period, unions reported a
total of 2896 elections,65 730 card check events,66 and 152 mergers
or affiliations.67  Both the numbers of elections and card checks
events reported in WIP declined between 1998 and 2005, with a
notable decline occurring between 2000 and 2001.  The decline in
2001 could be related to disruptions caused by the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks against the United States.68  The data also
reflects a notable decline between 2004 and 2005.  This was likely
caused by the departure of four unions from the AFL-CIO to form
their own organization, The Change to Win Coalition, in the sum-
mer of 2005.69  As described below,70 these unions were among the
64. See Henry S. Farber, Union Membership in the United States: The Divergence
between the Public and Private Sectors (Princeton Univ. Indus. Rel. Section, Working
Paper No. 503, 2005) (showing that while between 1972 and 2004 there has been a
steady decline in union membership rates in the private sector, union membership
rates in the public sector increased dramatically during the 1970s and have remained
fairly steady since then).
65. The “election” category includes all government conducted activities.  Thus, it
includes elections under the NLRA, as well as elections conducted under the various
public sector laws (both federal and state). See infra p. 273 tbl.1.
66. The “Card Check” category includes all those events reported as a card check
in WIP. See id.
67. The “Mergers and Affiliations” category includes all those events reported in
WIP as such.  “Mergers” refer to the merging of two unions. See, e.g., AFL-CIO,
Driving and Flying, WORK IN PROGRESS (Jan. 8, 2001), http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/
thisistheaflcio/publications/wip/wip01082001.cfm (reporting the merger between the
unaffiliated Chicago Truck Drivers Union and Teamsters Local 710). “Affiliations”
include situations in which a previously independent union became affiliated directly
with the AFL-CIO or with a union that was already a member of the AFL-CIO. See,
e.g., AFL-CIO, Public Employees Join SEIU, WORK IN PROGRESS, May 26, 1998,
http://www.aflcio.org/aboutus/thisistheaflcio/publications/wip/wip05261998.cfm (re-
porting the decision by members of the Public Employees of Riverside County organ-
ization to affiliate with the SEIU).  In addition to the three categories identified in the
text (i.e., elections, card checks and mergers/affiliations) WIP reported other forms of
organizing events.  These included, for example, an employer signing an area wide
existing collective bargaining agreement, the reporting of some new members joining
an existing bargaining unit, and an election conducted by a non-governmental
organization.
68. See Clark et al., supra note 4, at 5-7 (describing the effects on unions and R
union related activity of the September 11, 2001 events).
69. See Steven Greenhouse, Four Major Unions Plan to Boycott A.F.L.-C.I.O
Event,  N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 2005, at A1, A16.  These unions included the Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters, the Service Employees International Union,
UNITE-HERE, and the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union.
These four unions were later joined by three other unions in the Change to Win Coa-
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most active AFL-CIO unions in terms of their organizing activities.
Even if we disregard the last year of the data, it is interesting to
note that neither the number of elections, nor the number of card
checks have bounced back to pre-2001 levels.
Table 1 also provides information about the relative occurrence
of different types of organizing events.  The 2896 election events
constituted about seventy-five percent of the total number of
events; card checks represented nineteen percent of the total, and
mergers and affiliations constituted about four percent of the total.
Thus, the WIP data suggest that although elections continue to be
the most common type of organizing event, card checks are fairly
common, with mergers and affiliations lagging far behind.
In terms of the total number of employees brought into the
AFL-CIO by each of the various types of organizing events, Table
2 shows that about half (52%) did so by means of government
sponsored elections.  Card checks, on the other hand, resulted in
the addition of 245,823 members (about 13%), while new members
brought via mergers and affiliations amounted to over 600,000, or
about a third of the total.  Thus, contrary to recently reported
figures,71 the data collected from the WIP reports indicate that the
two most traditional types of organizing events (elections and
mergers/affiliations) served as the main avenue for bringing new
employees into the labor movement.  Although not insignificant,
the card-check process ranks third in terms of the number of newly
organized employees.
Table 2 also allows us to explore the types of employees organ-
ized under each of the various methods.  About twice as many
“Non-NLRA Employees” (these include public sector and other
non-NLRA employees) joined AFL-CIO unions through govern-
ment-sponsored elections (65.3%) as compared to “NLRA Em-
ployees” (34.7%).72  Exactly the opposite is true for card checks.
About sixty-five percent of employees joining via card checks were
“NLRA Employees” while a little bit over a third (35%) were
lition (the Laborers International Union of North America, the United Farm Work-
ers, and United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America).
70. See infra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
71. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 828. R
72. Table 2 shows that of the 982,926 employees organized through elections,
641,757 (588,206 “Public Employees” and 53,551 “Other Non-NLRA Employees”)
were not covered by the NLRA.  In comparison, only 341,169 of all the employees
organized through elections were covered by the NLRA. See infra p. 273 tbl.2.
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“Non-NLRA Employees.”73  These figures suggest that while the
card check process is used less frequently than other more tradi-
tional organizing methods, card checks are used more frequently to
target employees that fall under the jurisdiction of the NLRA.
Elections, however, are the most commonly used organizing
method for all types of employees.
The data in Tables 1 and 2 raise several important issues regard-
ing the use of card checks under the existing legal framework.  The
WIP data confirm the proposition that card checks have become a
common organizing method, particularly in the private sector
where unions have been more likely to use the card check process,
thus allowing them to avoid what they perceive to be an unfair
NLRA election process.  Perhaps because employees not covered
under the NLRA operate under legal frameworks which unions
perceive as more fair, there is less need for unions to avoid the
election process in favor of alternate organizing methods.74  Recall
that a large proportion of what we refer to as “Non-NLRA Em-
ployees” is public sector employees.  Public employers are widely
believed to be less likely to mount vigorous campaigns against or-
ganizing drives, and thus are less likely to engage in illegal and dila-
tory behavior during the course of the organizing campaign.75
The WIP data also raise some doubts about the claim made by
advocates of the proposed legislation that card checks have be-
come the primary means of organizing new workers.  For example,
Professor James Brudney argues that less than twenty percent of all
union organizing is conducted through Board-certified elections
and that most new members are now joining the labor movement
via card check recognition or some other alternative procedure.76
Professor Brudney arrives at this figure by comparing the total
number of employees organized via NLRB elections from 1998 to
2003 to the total number of employees the AFL-CIO reports to
have organized in these same years.  According to Brudney, only
about 550,000 employees out of nearly three million (about 18%)
73. Of the 245,823 employees organized via card checks, 159,022 were employees
covered by the NLRA, while 86,801 were not covered by the Act. See id.
74. For example, Charles Morris argues that employers operating under the Rail-
way Labor Act are significantly less likely to engage in illegal campaign activities than
employers operating under the NLRA. See Morris, supra note 30, at 317-18.
75. See Richard B. Freeman, Through Public Sector Eyes:  Employee Attitudes To-
ward Public Sector Labor Relations in the U.S., in PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT IN A
TIME OF TRANSITION 59, 79-80 (Dale Belman et al. eds., 1996).
76. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 828-30. R
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were organized through Board-supervised elections.77 Unfortu-
nately, there are some problems with the conclusions drawn from
these data.
First, as Brudney recognizes, the total number of employees he
reports as having joined the AFL-CIO during this period includes
both private and public employees.78  Public sector employees,
however, are not covered under the NLRA, and thus are not capa-
ble of being organized via an NLRB election.  Thus, including
newly organized public sector employees in the total number of
employees organized by AFL-CIO unions to evaluate the rele-
vance of the NLRA election process is inappropriate. Doing so
grossly understates the percentage of employees being organized
via NLRB-conducted elections.  In fact, the WIP data indicate that
between 1998 and 2005, more public sector than private sector em-
ployees joined the AFL-CIO.
Second, by arguing that card checks have displaced NLRB elec-
tions as the dominant method of union organizing, Brudney im-
plies that the majority of the eighty percent of employees not
organized through NLRB-conducted elections were organized
through card checks.79  As he acknowledges, however, this figure
includes employees who joined via mergers with AFL-CIO affili-
ated unions or via new affiliations with the AFL-CIO, as well as
through other organizing methods.80  Our data show more employ-
ees were brought into the AFL-CIO through mergers and affilia-
tions than through card checks.  Moreover, employees “joining”
the AFL-CIO through mergers and affiliations hardly constitute
newly organized employees into the labor movement and, there-
fore, do not seem germane to an evaluation of the relevance of the
NLRA election process.  Again, including them in the total num-
ber of employees organized by AFL-CIO unions grossly under-
states the percentage of employees being organized via NLRB-
conducted elections.
B. Reports of Organizing Activity by Union
The data collected from WIP also allow us to identify the unions
involved in the various reported organizing events.  Table 3 pro-
vides a breakdown of organizing events by union.81  Column 2 of
77. Id. at 828.
78. Id. at 829.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See infra p. 274 tbl.3.
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Table 3 reports the total number of organizing events.  Column 3
reports the number of election events.  Column 4 provides the
number of card check events.  Column 5 reports the number of
employees organized through all the reported organizing events.
Columns 6 and 7 break down the number of employees organized
according to whether they were “NLRA” or “Non-NLRA” em-
ployees.  The numbers in parentheses represent the percentages of
those employees who were organized through card checks.
The Table 3 figures indicate that the Service Employee Interna-
tional Union (“SEIU”) was the most active union both in terms of
organizing events and in terms of the total number of employees
organized, followed by the American Federation of State, County
and Municipal Employees (“AFSCME”).  In terms of organizing
events, AFSCME was followed by United Food and Commercial
Workers (“UFCW”), the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“IBT”), and the Communications Workers of America (“CWA”).
While these three unions were very active in terms of the total
number of organizing events, their contribution to the reported to-
tal number of newly organized employees ranked toward the mid-
dle of those unions listed in Table 3.82  Rounding out the top five in
terms of the total number of employees organized are the Interna-
tional Association of Machinists (“IAM”), the American Federa-
tion of Teachers (“AFT”), and the United American Nurses
(“UAN”).83
The data in Table 3 also reveal that unions differed widely in
their use of card check recognition.  Six unions—AFSCME, CWA,
Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Union (“HERE”),
SEIU, UFCW, and Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile
Employees Union (“UNITE”)—account for more than three
quarters (76%) of all the reported card check events.84  AFSCME
reported seventy successful card checks or fourteen percent of its
total number of organizing events.  The CWA reported 103 suc-
cessful card checks (41% of its reported organizing events), while
HERE reported 144 (about 62% of its reported organizing events).
The SEIU reported 138 successful card checks, or about eighteen
percent of all their organizing activity, while UFCW reported fifty-
five, or about fifteen percent of its total number of reported events.
Finally, UNITE reported forty-five successful card checks, or about
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. These six unions reported having successfully participated in 555 out of the 730
card checks included in the data. Id.
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thirty-five percent of its total number of events. For all but three of
the remaining unions listed in Table 3, card checks represented no
more than about fifteen percent of the total number of reported
organizing events.85
These figures suggest that the use of card checks during the pe-
riod under study was concentrated in a few unions.  For some un-
ions the card check was especially important in organizing “NLRA
Employees.”  Columns 6 and 7 in Table 3 show the number of
“NLRA” and “Non-NLRA” Employees organized by each union.
For instance, eighty-two percent of the 45,791 “NLRA Employees”
organized by HERE were organized through the card check pro-
cess.86  For the CWA, the corresponding figure was 58.7%.  For
“Non-NLRA Employees,” only the International Union of Oper-
ating Engineers (“OPEIU”) organized more than fifty percent of
new employees via card checks.  On the other hand, most of the
other unions included in Table 3 organized no more than about
twenty-five percent of employees through card check recognition.
C. Reports of Organizing Activity by Industry
Although in recent years unions have been increasingly willing
to cross traditional industry jurisdictional boundaries to organize
outside their core industries,87 most unions are still strongly identi-
fied with one or a few main industries.  Consequently, one would
expect that since card checks are used primarily by a few unions,
there will be a corresponding concentration in terms of the distri-
bution of industries in which card checks have become most com-
mon.  Table 4 provides support for that proposition.88  Table 4 lists
the total number of reported organizing events (column 2), the
number of reported elections (column 3), the number of reported
card checks (column 4), and the total number of employees organ-
ized (column 5), by industry classification.89
85. UNITE-HERE, created in 2004 as a merger between UNITE and HERE re-
ported fourteen card check events (about 74% of all its reported events).   For the
International Federation of Professional and Technical Engineers (“IFPTE”) and the
International Union of Operating Engineers (“OPEIU”), card checks represented
about 21% of all their organizing activities.  Michael Bologna, UNITE, HERE Dele-
gates Approve Merger, DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), July 9, 2004 at A-9.
86. The same was true for UNITE-HERE.  Eighty-seven percent of the 3782
“NLRA Employees” organized by UNITE-HERE joined via card checks. Id.
87. See Jack Rasmus, The AFL-CIO Split:  What Next for American Labor?, Z
MAG. ONLINE, Sept. 2005, http://zmagsite.zmag.org/Sep2005/rasmuspr0905.html.
88. See infra p. 275 tbl.4.
89. We used the North American Industry Code System (NAICS), which is used
in the National Labor Relations Board’s Election Reports.  “The NAICS was devel-
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The data in Table 4 suggest that the use of card checks is concen-
trated in four industries.  Of the 730 card check events reported in
WIP, 427 (58%) involved the following four industry classifica-
tions:  Accommodations and Foodservices (117 reported card
checks), Health Care and Social Assistance (111 reported card
checks), Information (73 reported card checks), and Public Admin-
istration (126 reported card checks).  Furthermore, card checks ac-
counted for the majority of new union members in five industries,
including the aforementioned “Information” and “Accommoda-
tion and Food Services” industries, as well as “Apparel Manufac-
turing,” “Amusement, Gambling and Recreation,” and “Food and
Beverages.”
Not surprisingly these industries have traditionally been the core
organizing grounds for the unions that we identified above as being
the most active users of the card check process.  For example, the
SEIU has traditionally organized workers in the health care and
public service sectors.90  UNITE and HERE have enjoyed a strong
presence in the apparel, hospitality, and food services industries,91
while the CWA has organized workers in broadcasting and
telecommunications.92
The data in Tables 3 and 4 show that under the present legal
landscape, the use of card checks is fairly concentrated among a
few unions and within those unions’ traditional industry organizing
targets.  Although a systematic analysis of the reasons behind this
finding is beyond the scope of this Article, we submit that eco-
nomic factors related to the industries in which card checks are
most common may help explain this finding.  If this is correct, and
assuming that there is no change in the existing legal framework
regulating the organizing process or in industry conditions, one
oped jointly by the U.S., Canada, and Mexico to provide new comparability in statis-
tics about business activity across North America.” U.S. Census Bureau, North
American Industry Classification System, http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/naics.html
(last visited Jan. 3, 2008).  For NLRB-conducted elections, we used the same entry as
reported in the Election Reports.  For those events not included in the Election Re-
ports (e.g., card checks, or those involving Non-NLRA Employees), we decided the
appropriate industry code based on the information provided in WIP.  When neces-
sary we looked at various sources to assess the appropriate industry category. See
infra p. 275 tbl.4.
90. See Service Employees International Union, SEIU History, http://www.seiu.
org/about/seiu_history/index.cfm (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
91. See UNITE-HERE, What is UNITE HERE?, http://www.unitehere.org/about/
(last visited Jan, 3, 2008).
92. See Communications Workers of America, Profile & History, http://www.cwa-
union.org/about/profile.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2008).
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would expect the use of card checks to continue to be largely lim-
ited to those industries where card checks are currently used.
If, on the other hand, the NLRA is amended along the lines of
the proposed Employee Free Choice Act of 2007, and unions are
given the right to demand card check recognition, unions will likely
rely on card checks more heavily in order to avoid the more cum-
bersome and time consuming election process.93  At the same time,
to the extent employer opposition to unions is based on economic
or industry driven factors, one should not expect employer acquies-
cence to union organizing.  Instead employer opposition to unions
would likely appear at other points in the organizing process.  In
other words, employers would adapt to the new legal paradigm
regulating union organizing in ways that protect their interests.
To see this, consider the reasons employers might have for op-
posing an organizing drive.  Employer opposition to unions has
been modeled primarily as an economic decision.94  According to
this model, when facing a union organizing drive employers make a
fairly straightforward cost-benefit calculation and act accordingly.
In particular, employers evaluate the likely effect that engaging in
opposition tactics will have on the likelihood of a union victory, the
costs associated with mounting a campaign against the union, and
the extent to which the presence of a union will affect the firm’s
profitability.  Employers are more likely to oppose the organizing
drive in situations where such opposition is likely to impact the
outcome of the election,95 where the costs associated with mount-
ing an anti-union campaign are small,96 and the impact that a union
could have on the firm’s profitability is large.97
93. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
94. See Richard B. Freeman & Morris M. Kleiner, Employer Behavior in the Face
of Union Organizing Drives, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 351, 364 (1990) (developing
an empirical model of employer opposition to organizing campaigns).
95. Where the employer thinks that the union is very likely to win, or where the
union is highly unlikely to win, one would expect the employer to be less inclined to
engage in opposition activities.  On the other hand, where the outcome of the election
is uncertain, employers are likely to actively oppose the organizing drive. Id. at 352-
53.
96. Conducting a campaign in opposition of the union could be an expensive pro-
position for the employer.  For example, hiring consultants and training supervisors to
respond to the organizing efforts is costly both in terms of direct payments, as well as
lost productivity time.  In addition, employers might choose to engage in marginally
or clearly unfair labor practices, which will require the employer to pay for legal ad-
vice and potentially legal representation. Id.
97. In particular, the larger the wage differential the union is expected to negoti-
ate, the more likely the employer is to oppose the organizing drive. Id.
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Recent industry-level studies of the industries that our data sug-
gest have been the primary targets of card check activity provide
evidence that in each of these industries the factors mentioned
above were such that one would expect less employer opposition to
union organizing.  For example, consider the health care industry.
Because of an increased demand for health care services, fueled in
part by the aging U.S. population and the increased demand for
medical care, there has been a corresponding increase in the de-
mand for nurses.98  This heightened competition for nurses resulted
in an industry-wide push for higher wages.99  As a result, the union/
nonunion wage differential among all nurses has been relatively
small as compared to all other occupations.100  The relatively small
union/non-union wage differential among nurses suggests that,
other things held constant, the union’s effect on the profitability of
the firm is likely to be relatively small.  In turn, employers in the
industry should be less likely, as compared to employers at large, to
oppose a union organizing campaign.101  The willingness of em-
ployers to voluntarily agree to recognize the union by means of a
card check process is evidence of this.
A similar incentive has been identified in the hotel and hospital-
ity industry.  In particular, the upper-segment establishments in the
hotel industry102 have adopted a high-price/high-quality business
strategy, under which competition is based on the delivery of high-
quality service to their customers.103  This business strategy re-
quires the existence of a stable and well-trained labor force.  There
is some evidence that employers in the hotel industry viewed un-
ions as a means to reduce employee turnover and facilitate the ac-
98. See Paul F. Clark, Health Care: A Growing Role for Collective Bargaining, in
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 91, 118 (Paul F. Clark et al. eds.,
2002).
99. Id. at 118, 122-23.
100. The union/non-union wage differential for nurses in 2001 was 13%. The union/
non-union wage differential for all other occupations was 28%. Id. at 122.
101. The fact that employers in the health care industry might be more likely, as
compared to employers in general, to agree to card checks, does not mean that all
health care employers will have exactly the same incentives to acquiesce to such de-
mands by unions.  Thus, it is not surprising to see unions organizing this industry using
corporate campaigns to put pressure on employers to recognize the union. See, e.g.,
Jessica Fargen, Union Taking Aim at Hospitals:  Kicks Off Ad Campaign to Unionize
Workers, BOSTON HERALD, Sept. 15, 2007, at 5.
102. “Upper-segment establishments” include “high price upscale hotels, as well as
mid-priced full-service properties. See C. Jeffrey Waddoups & Vincent E. Eade, Ho-
tels and Casinos:  Collective Bargaining During a Decade of Expansion, in COLLEC-
TIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 137, 140 (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2002).
103. Id. at 141.
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cumulation of human capital via training and a longer term
employment relationship.104  To the extent that employers believed
that having a union could lead to lower turnover and training costs,
one would expect less opposition to union organizing activities.
Again, this lower level of opposition is reflected in the willingness
of employers to enter into card check agreements.
The telecommunications industry experienced some similar dy-
namics.  In the 1990s, employers in the information and telecom-
munications industry realized that an amicable co-existence with
the union was a pre-requisite to gain the union’s support in ob-
taining necessary regulatory relief and in acquiescing to necessary
corporate restructuring.105  The major employers in the telecom-
munications industry (which were for the most part the regional
components of the Bell System) sought changes in the rate struc-
tures for local telecommunications markets.106  As those rates were
regulated at the state level by state public services commissions,107
an opportunity opened for the use of union political leverage.  The
unions, however, were reluctant to cooperate unless the major em-
ployers agreed to provide unions with some guarantee of institu-
tional security.  These guarantees came in the form of promises to
avoid opposition campaigns to union organizing, relying instead on
card checks and neutrality agreements.108
Finally, the high level of reported card checks in the public sec-
tor is not surprising.  Public sector employers have traditionally
been less hostile towards unions than their private sector counter-
parts.109  Survey data indicate that public sector employees per-
ceive their employers as generally more likely to welcome a union
than private employers, and also more willing to share authority
over workplace issues.110  Research also indicates that public sector
employers are less likely to engage in both legal and illegal anti-
union tactics in the course of an organizing campaign.111  Thus, to
the extent that public sector employers have a higher level of toler-
104. Id.
105. See Jeffrey Keefe & Rosemary Batt, Telecommunications: Collective Bargain-
ing in an Era of Industry Reconsolidation, in COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE PRI-
VATE SECTOR 263, 278-79 (Paul F. Clark et al. eds., 2002).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 300.
109. See Farber, supra note 64, at 13. R
110. See Freeman, supra note 75, at 79-80. R
111. See Richard Freeman, Unionism Comes to the Public Sector, 24 J. OF ECON.
LITERATURE 41, 49 (Mar. 1986) (discussing unionization trends in the public sector).
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ance for unions than private sector employers, it is not surprising
that they have been frequent users of the card check process.
This short overview of these four industry groups suggests that
there exist various industry-specific factors which help explain the
higher levels of card check numbers in these industries.  In particu-
lar, it appears that employers operating in these industries had
some clear economic reasons for voluntarily agreeing to card
checks.  While card checks occurred in several other industrial sec-
tors,112 the fact that these four sectors accounted for a vast majority
of the total number of card check events suggests that industry spe-
cific economic characteristics might be playing an important role.
To be sure, the unions that are primarily identified with these in-
dustries (the CWA, the SEIU, and UNITE-HERE) have been tra-
ditionally characterized as creative and entrepreneurial in their
organizing efforts, and they have successfully used card checks in
various other industries.113  As such, it is possible that over time
they themselves, or in association with other unions, could expand
the use of card checks to other industrial sectors.  On the other
hand, the data reported in WIP appear to indicate that the success
of card checks has been limited to some fairly specific industries.
V. IMPLICATIONS
Our data provide a new and somewhat more nuanced picture of
the use of card checks in relation to the various forms of organizing
activities unions frequently utilize.  In particular, our data show
that while important, card checks do not appear to be the most
frequently used organizing tactic.  According to the data collected
from WIP, about 18% of all organizing activities and about 20% of
all newly organized employees were organized via card checks.  We
find, however, that card checks have become an important tool in
some specific contexts.  Over two thirds of the reported card
checks (64.6%) involved private sector employees covered under
112. In fact, in some of the other industrial sectors included in our data, card checks
represented a fairly large percentage of all their organizing activity.  For example, in
the Amusement, Gambling, and Recreational Facilities Industry, 77% (10 out of 13)
of all organizing events were card checks.  In the “Apparel Manufacturing” sector 13
out of 24 total events (54%) involved card check organizing.
113. For example, Table 4 shows that 73% of the 5066 employees organized in the
“Apparel Manufacturing” industry and 96% of the 11,994 workers in the “Amuse-
ment, Gambling, and Recreation” industry were organized via card checks. See infra
p. 275 tbl.4.  Both of these industries have been traditional UNITE-HERE targets.
See Bologna, supra note 85, at A-9 (noting that at the time of their merger, UNITE
organized workers in the clothing, textiles, and laundry industries, while HERE or-
ganized workers in the hotel, restaurant, and gaming industries).
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the NLRA, which suggests that card checks are primarily used
among employees who otherwise would have to be organized
through the NLRA process.  Thus, although the claim that
“[b]oard elections have ceased to be the dominant mechanism for
determining whether employees want union representation”114 ap-
pears to be an overstatement, card checks are an important compo-
nent of organizing private sector workers covered by the NLRA.
In particular, our data show that for some unions card checks have
become an extremely important organizing tool.  For at least one
union (UNITE-HERE) card checks represent the majority of their
organizing activities.  Similarly, for several other unions, (e.g.
CWA, UFCW), sizeable proportions of their newly organized pri-
vate sector employees have been organized via card checks.
Our data also show that a substantial proportion of card check
activity has occurred in a small number of industries.  We argue
that the concentration of card checks in these industries is not sur-
prising because of conditions that make it more economically feasi-
ble for employers to deal with unions.  These conditions reduce
employers’ incentives to aggressively fight union organizing efforts.
By the same token, the lower level of card check activity in other
industries represented in our data suggests that employers in those
industries may face economic incentives to oppose organizing ef-
forts, or at least to refuse to voluntarily recognize the union on the
basis of a card check showing of interest.  Amending the NLRA to
allow the Board to certify unions on the basis of card checks will
not change the economic incentives employers in these industries
face for avoiding unions and, consequently, they are likely to adopt
various tactics designed to prevent union organizing.  A change in
the law may simply cause a shift in the timing at which these em-
ployers will mount their anti-union campaigns.
In particular, we suggest that employers who presently have no
incentives to agree to card check agreements could adopt preemp-
tive tactics designed to reduce the likelihood of a union organizing
campaign.  As is true of tactics which employers currently use dur-
ing an election campaign, some of these tactics might prove to be
legal and some illegal.  For example, employers could respond by
adopting positive/proactive measures intended to eliminate the em-
ployees’ need for union representation.  These measures could in-
clude:  establishing an adequate and equitable compensation
system; developing positive supervisory-employee relations; estab-
114. See Brudney, supra note 12, at 824. R
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lishing open channels of communication; and  adopting some form
of alternative dispute resolution system to deal with employees’
concerns.115  These tactics are intended to eliminate the types of
issues that a union could use to generate support for an organizing
campaign.116  Employees who are satisfied with their current work-
ing conditions are generally less likely to participate in organizing
campaigns and less likely to ultimately vote for union
representation.117
Employers, however, could also adopt negative/proactive tactics.
For example, employers could aggressively screen out pro-union
job candidates during the hiring process.118  This screening could be
accomplished in a variety of ways.  Employers could question job
applicants about their union sentiments.  While asking such ques-
tions directly is illegal,119 various observers have noted that compa-
nies could use indirect methods to achieve the same objective.120
For example, employers in an industry with traditionally high
unionization rates might seek to hire employees with no prior work
experience in the industry, on the assumption those employees are
less likely to have belonged to a union.121
Although the NLRA protects employees against some of these
practices, research shows that the NLRA is virtually unknown to a
large number of employees.  Section 7 of the NLRA explicitly pro-
tects all employees who engage in “concerted activities for the pur-
pose of . . . other mutual aid or protection.”122  This protection
applies not just to employees represented by labor unions, but to
nearly all private sector employees in the United States, and the
United States Supreme Court has directly upheld the NLRA’s
115. See LEAP, supra note 24, at 146-48. R
116. Id. at 147.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 148.
119. See, e.g., Center Construction Company, Inc., Cases 7-CA-46490, 2004 WL
2138582 (NLRB Sept. 21, 2004) (finding questions concerning union sympathies in the
context of job application interviews to be inherently coercive); Rochester Cadet
Cleaners, Inc., 205 N.L.R.B. 773 (1973) (finding that the employer violated the NLRA
by asking a job applicant whether her former employers were unionized and whether
she had belonged to a union).
120. See Gregory M. Saltzman, Job Applicant Screening by a Japanese Transplant:
A Union-Avoidance Tactic, 49 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 88, 91 (1995) (discussing
some of the tactics used by Japanese automobile plants operating in the United States
to screen out union sympathizers).
121. Id.
122. 29 U.S.C. § 157.
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broad-scale protection of non-unionized workers in this regard.123
At the same time, the application of the NLRA in non-union set-
tings is, as Professor William R. Corbett has noted, “one of the
best-kept secrets” of employment law.124  It is quite possible that
many employees will simply be unaware that employers’ tactics de-
signed to screen out those with pro-union tendencies are illegal.125
Thus, the proposed amendments to the NLRA, intended to facil-
itate card check recognition, raise the possibility of increased union
avoidance behavior by employers at pre-organizing stages in the
employment relationship.126  The shift in employers’ tactics could
prove to be particularly effective given the lack of employees’
awareness of their rights under the NLRA.  It could be argued that
in anticipation of this change in employers’ tactics, proposed
amendments to provide card check recognition should include lan-
guage addressing the potential illegality of the type of pre-organiz-
ing union avoidance campaign tactics we identify above.
In fact, the Employee Free Choice Act of 2007 includes a section
establishing stronger penalties for employers’ actions violating sec-
tions 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(3) while employees “were seeking represen-
tation by a labor organization or during the period after a labor
organization was recognized as a representative” of the employ-
ees.127  This language appears to expand currently available reme-
dies once the campaign has started and later when the union is
certified, but the proposed legislation does nothing to prevent the
type of behavior we suggest might ensue on the part of employers.
VI. CONCLUSION
Card check recognition has been around for a long time and our
data confirm the perception that card checks have become an im-
123. See NLRB v. Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962); Morris, supra note 30,
at 345-46.
124. See William Corbett, Waiting for the Labor Law of the Twenty-First Century:
Everything Old Is New Again, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 259, 267 (2002).
125. See generally Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study
of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
105, 106 (1997).
126. These proactive union avoidance practices are different than those practices
adopted by employers in response to an organizing drive.  In addition to screening
employees with pro-union sentiments, employers can also establish a culture not con-
ducive to union representation. See LEAP, supra note 24, at 146-48. R
127. The EFCA allows for civil fines, increases back pay awards, and requires the
NLRB to seek an injunction against employers in cases involving threats or termina-
tions that interfere with employee rights during an organizing or first contract drive.
S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 1 (2007).
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portant organizing tool for unions.  Our data also support the as-
sertion that card checks have become a particularly useful
organizing tool for unions operating under the NLRA.  We also
find that while important, card checks have not, as of yet, become
the primary approach to organizing new members.  Thus, in addi-
tion to seeking legislation protecting the card check process, unions
and their supporters should also continue to push for other ways of
strengthening organizing protections provided under existing law.
For example, during President Clinton’s administration the
NLRB expanded the use of section 10(j) injunctions with the intent
of further deterring section 8(a)(3) violations.128  The Employee
Free Choice Act requires the Board to use injunctions in cases
where there is a reasonable cause to believe the employer has dis-
charged or discriminated, or threatens to discharge or discriminate,
against employees, or engaged in conduct that significantly inter-
feres with employee rights during an organizing or first contract
drive.129  Regardless of what happens to the card check provisions,
unions will benefit from the more assertive use of the 10(j) injunc-
tion.  Similarly, prior attempts to reform the NLRA, such as the
Labor Law Reform Act of 1977-78, focused on issues of equal ac-
cess by employees to the workplace.130  Improving the ability of
unions to communicate with employees would also be of value to
union organizing efforts.  Of course, whether any of these propos-
als would likely pass in today’s political climate is highly doubtful,
particularly given the fact that the AFL-CIO and labor unions gen-
erally are in a much weaker economic and political position
today.131
Our finding that card check recognition is largely confined to
certain industries suggests that employers who presently refuse un-
ions’ requests for card check recognition are likely to find ways of
opposing organizing drives, even under the proposed legislation.
These new tactics could be extremely effective in undermining the
ability of employees to form unions.  Existing legislative proposals
128. See Morris, supra note 30, at 345-46. R
129. S. 1041, 110th Cong. § 1.
130. See Comment, Labor Law Reform:  The Regulation of Free Speech and Equal
Access in NLRB Representation Elections, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (1979). Despite the
existence of a pro-union Democratic President supporting NLRA reform legislation,
and pro-union Democratic majorities in both the United States House of Representa-
tives and the United States Senate, the reform proposal ended up being successfully
filibustered in the United States Senate. Id.
131. See Kris Maher, Signs of a Possible Power Shift in Congress Have Unions Go-
ing All Out to Reach Voters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28, 2006, at A2.
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are silent in this regard.  Our research suggests that the possibility
of a shift in employers’ tactics should be recognized and adequately
addressed.
TABLE 1
AFL-CIO REPORTS OF ORGANIZING METHODS,
1998-2005*
Card Mergers &
Year Elections Checks Affiliations Other Total
1998 415 69 19 7 510
1999 431 141 24 9 605
2000 478 122 8 21 629
2001 358 83 24 12 477
2002 370 81 26 5 482
2003 366 84 28 7 485
2004 304 91 9 8 412
2005 174 59 14 0 247
All Years 2896 730 152 69 3847
* There were ten organizing incidents for which we were unable to determine the organizing
method.
TABLE 2
AFL-CIO REPORTS OF EMPLOYEES JOINING
THE LABOR MOVEMENT THROUGH
VARIOUS ORGANIZING
METHODS, 1998-2005
(NUMBER OF REPORTED INCIDENTS)*
Mergers &
Total Elections Card Checks Affiliations Other
All Employees 982,926 245,823 624,054 38,193
(2886) (721) (152) (69)
NLRA Employees 341,169 159,022 246,310 15,998
(2048) (562) (73) (51)
Public Employees 588,206 82,356 368,020 13,069
(737) (136) (73) (12)
Other Non-NLRA 53,551 4,445 9,724 9,126
Employees (101) (23) (6) (6)
* Missing data on the numbers of employees organized, whether or not employees were
covered by the NLRA, and/or the organizing method reduced the usable observations for this
table.
\\server05\productn\F\FUJ\35-2\FUJ201.txt unknown Seq: 28  3-MAR-08 9:12
274 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXV
TABLE 3
AFL-CIO REPORTS OF EMPLOYEES JOINING
THE LABOR MOVEMENT BY UNION,
1998-2005*
(Percent from Card Checks)
Reported Non-
Reported Reported Card Total NLRA NLRA
Union** Incidents Elections Checks Employees Employees Employees
AFGE 34 30 3 31,556 200 31,356
(3.5) (0.0) (3.5)
AFSCME 493 401 70 177,629 23,516 154,113
(20.0) (11.0) (21.4)
AFT 191 143 23 147,233 15,185 132,048
(7.6) (4.1) (8.0)
CWA 249 126 103 63,306 46,463 16,843
(49.1) (58.7) (22.4)
HERE 233 82 144 48,254 45,791 2,463
(80.0) (82.1) (40.8)
IAM 110 92 12 154,895 13,620 141,275
(1.9) (21.1) (.5)
IBT 319 285 26 47,340 27,860 19,480
(17.1) (11.2) (25.5)
IFPTE 19 11 4 56,645 54,110 2,535
(1.6) (1.4) (4.8)
OPEIU 23 13 5 33,576 31,815 1,761
(5.0) (1.7) (64.7)
SEIU 775 592 138 507,402 162,230 344,030
(9.3) (16.7) (5.8)
UAN 8 6 0 105,500 100,500 5,000
(0.0) (0.0) (0.0)
UAW 207 176 29 89,989 54,782 35,207
(20.6) (20.0) (21.6)
UFCW 365 303 55 74,727 64,785 9,942
(24.5) (23.8) (29.2)
UNITE 130 80 45 33,826 31,456 2,370
(28.0) (30.1) (0.0)
UNITE- 19 5 14 4,053 3,782 271
HERE (82.6) (87.9) (7.7)
* Used 30,000 new employees as selection cut-off, except for UNITE-HERE.
** See Appendix for a list of the full names of the unions included in the table.
Notes: Table 3 excludes the California State Employee Association (CSEA).  The 175,000
CSEA members affiliated with the AFL-CIO in 2001.
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TABLE 4
AFL-CIO REPORTS OF EMPLOYEES JOINING
THE LABOR MOVEMENT BY
INDUSTRY, 1998-2005*
(Percent from Card Checks)
Reported Reported Reported Total
Industry Incidents Elections Card-Checks Employees
Food Manufacturing 80 67 12 20,058
(21.9)
Apparel 24 11 13 5,066
Manufacturing (73.3)
Transportation 112 85 22 89,562
Equipment (11.9)
Manufacturing
Food & Beverages/ 58 34 23 9,037
General Merchandise (53.6)
Stores
Information 168 83 73 42,743
(Broadcasting & (58.5)
Telecommunications;
Information Services
& Data Processing)
Educational Services 120 103 13 23,884
(3.2)
Health Care and 865 720 111 317,034
Social Assistance (8.6)
Performing Arts, 37 23 12 9,434
Spectator Sports, and (37.0)
Related Industries
Amusement, 13 3 10 11,994
Gambling, and (96.1)
Recreation Industries
Accommodation and 219 97 117 42,527
Food Services (78.6)
Personal and 113 71 38 24,139
Laundry Services (31.0)
Public 857 655 126 912,738
Administration (8.6)
* Report only includes industries having at least ten reported card check organizing successes.
There were 193 organizing events for which we were not able to identify the industry.  These
193 events included 131 elections and 35 card checks, and resulted in the addition of 165,659
employees.
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APPENDIX
OFFICIAL FULL NAME OF UNIONS INCLUDED IN TABLE 3
Union
Acronym Name
AFGE American Federation of Government Employees
AFSCME American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees
AFT American Federation of Teachers
CWA Communications Workers of America
HERE Hotel Employees & Restaurant Employees Union
IAM International Association of Machinists
IBT International Brotherhood of Teamsters
IFPTE International Federation of Professional & Technical Engineers
OPEIU International Union of Operating Engineers
SEIU Service Employees International Union
UAN United American Nurses
UAW United Automobile, Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
of America
UFCW United Food and Commercial Workers International Union
UNITE Union of Needletrades, Industrial and Textile Employees
USWA United Steelworkers of America
